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Abstract
This article is focused on nuclear transboundary issues between Portugal and Spain, two 
countries that share a long history of nuclear collaboration and conflict of late, where 
national borders played a crucial role. The issues at stake cover the full  spectrum of the 
nuclear cycle: uranium mining, power production and waste disposal. The first stage, 
under two fascist dictatorships, was characterised by  collaboration within a common 
techno-political imaginary, where nuclear energy was understood as a driver of moder-
nity, but with the absence of the public in decision-making processes. The second stage 
was marked by the advent of  democracy in both countries and the reconfiguration of 
nuclear policies: while Portugal  abandoned the nuclear endeavour, Spain implemented 
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the useful comments the scholars 
present at the Siting Nuclear Installations at Borders. Transnational political 
implications and societal responses workshop supported by the Interdisciplinary 
Centre for Border Research “Crossing Borders” Humboldt University Berlin 
in November 2017, Nuno Madureira and the reviewers and editors of this 
volume. The Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project 
ref. HAR2017-86086-R) financed parts the meetings and research required 
to complete this piece. This project has received funding from the Euratom 
research and training programme 2014-2018 under grant agreement N°662268. 
Despite of this, the views expressed here are of the entire responsibility of the 
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a nuclear moratorium but kept ten reactors operative. The third phase, which started 
in 1986 and goes until the present time, was marked by two crucial events: joining the 
European Communities (EC) and the Chernobyl accident. The first event allowed 
Brussels to become a referee on Spanish/Portuguese nuclear disputes. The second one 
implied that Portugal expanded its institutional vigilance on Spanish nuclear activities 
and led to the emergence of transboundary social movements against nuclear power.
Keywords
nuclear power plants, uranium mines, waste repositories, cross-border,  cooperation, 
anti-nulcear
Introduction
Portugal and Spain share a land border of 1214 kilometres, one of the longest 
borders between two countries in Western Europe. It was originally estab-
lished in 1143 and most recently revised in 1926. Three of the five main rivers 
of the Iberian Peninsula cross the border flowing from Spain into Portugal 
(Tagus, Douro and Guadiana, the last two serving as the border at times). 
Divided by the political frontier, the border regions share ecosystems and 
geographical, historical, cultural and economic elements, as well as a long 
history of collaboration and conflict. On both sides, the border areas are 
characterized by low population densities and a relative economic underde-
velopment, due to the arid climate and the distance to the economic centres 
of each nation (Dobado, 2006). There is some literature on border issues 
between Spain and Portugal, encompassing economic, political and envi-
ronmental aspects (Lorenzana and Mateos, 2008; Medeiros, 2010; Gualda 
et al. 2013; Calderón, 2015; Martin and Hortelano, 2017). However, there 
is no scholarly work on the historical evolution of transboundary nuclear 
issues between the two Iberian nations. As Kaijser and Meyer define in the 
introduction to this special issue: “Transboundary issues relate to a prob-
lem which is due to a shared border between two (or more) neighbouring 
countries (…) they result from external, cross-border effects of risks or 
pollution, which are at geographical proximity (…) and trigger a variety 
of transboundary relations between different kinds of actors, at different 
geographical and political scales” (Kaijser and Meyer, 2018a).
The Iberian history of nuclear border issues is an emblematic case study 
to delve into the interplay of politics, technology and social movements 
at different geographical levels, from the local to the national. It high-
lights the transnational dimension of nuclear projects and its potential 
to generate social and political dissent, showing how the civil uses of the 
atom have generated strong social and political reactions and affected 
35
 Siting (and mining) at the border 
diplomatic relations. Over the past 900 years, this border has witnessed 
wars, commercial exchange, competition over the control of natural 
resources as well as cooperative relations.
The Iberian Peninsula tends to be neglected in studies of anti-nuclear 
movements, which tend to focus on Central and Northern Europe (Börj 
and Pollusen, 2009; Milder, 2014 and 2017; Müller, 2013; Oberlé, 2016; 
Tompkins 2016a and 2016b). What makes the Iberian Peninsula a particularly 
interesting test case for nuclear transboundary issues is that it encompasses 
aspects relating to all stages of the nuclear cycle, from uranium mining to 
nuclear power and waste management, along with the dual transition from 
dictatorship to democracy, which is probably a unique case in Europe. 
Moreover, similar to the experience of transboundary relations between 
Danish and Sweden discussed in the special issue (Kaijser and Meyer 2018b) 
the Spanish/Portuguese context is marked by a long history of cooperation 
between nuclear institutions (public and private) across the border, that more 
recently prompted conflict, but also by the emergence of transboundary 
activist networks: a heterogeneous movement composed of environmental 
activists and former uranium miners. Over the past forty years, vibrant anti-
nuclear movements have flourished in both countries; however, they have 
only started to attract scholarly attention in the past decade (for Portugal see 
Araújo and Mendes, 2013; Barca and Delicado, 2016; Graça, 2017; Mendes 
and Araújo, 2011; Pereira, Fonseca and Carvalho, 2018; for the case of Spain 
see Costa Morata, 2009; Espluga et al. 2017; Hamilton, 2017).
Portugal never materialised its commercial nuclear ambitions, only 
operating an experimental reactor in Sacavém since 1961. The Spanish pro-
gram, however, operated at its peak ten commercial reactors, four of which 
use the Tagus River for cooling, which runs from Spain into Portugal (see 
Figure 1). Political disputes over the use of rivers that cross the border 
had existed between both countries from the days of the hydroelectric 
projects of the early twentieth century. They re-emerged in relation to 
nuclear issues towards the end of the century. The difference between the 
country upstream (Spain) and the country downstream (Portugal) marked 
the different perceptions about transboundary issues. Over the past three 
decades various Spanish plans for nuclear related facilities close to the 
Portuguese border have resulted in suspicion, diplomatic tensions and 
public mobilization, with relevant impacts on foreign relations and the 
unfolding of Spanish nuclear projects. In the case of Spain and Portugal, 
nuclear transboundary issues tended to escalate to supranational problems 
by the continuous call to Brussels, typically at the level of the European 
Commission, as referee by the Portuguese authorities.
Within this context, transboundary refers to issues that arise precisely 
because of the presence of a border, beyond which one of the contestants 
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has no legislative power over a matter that may potentially affect its own 
side of the border. Transboundary matters are transnational in essence 
since they affect more than one nation. However, transboundary issues 
are different from other transnational matters given that in other nuclear 
transnational conflicts the existence of a shared border between the 
contenders is irrelevant. This has become particularly evident after the 
Chernobyl accident, leading to the long-range spread of radioactive 
substances (Kalmbach, 2013), or the controversy over deep sea waste 
disposal (Hamblin, 2008). Both cases had transnational implications 
among nations not sharing a common border. Close proximity plays a 
larger role in transboundary issues, but “closeness” has a changing mean-
ing over time as we shall see. Our research addresses a central aspect of 
environmental humanities, ‘the complex interrelationships between 
human activity (cultural, economic, and political) and the environment, 
understood in its broadest sense’ (TORCH, 2016). In addition, the cases 
presented serve to reflect upon the interplay between the border as a 
political construction and the recognition that the environment is also a 
social phenomenon, one of the key insights stemming from environmental 
history (Warde et al., 2018).
Figure 1: Nuclear power projects in Portugal and Spain 1960s-2018, urban areas 
and main rivers 
Source: Own elaboration based on Rubio-Varas and De la Torre (2017) for the nuclear plants. For urban 
areas Schneider et al. (2003).
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In this article we set out to delve into the evolution of transboundary 
nuclear issues between Portugal and Spain over the past sixty years, trying 
to show how earlier chapters of this story help to understand the present. 
The parallel evolution of the institutional settings in both countries (from 
dictatorship to democracy and the simultaneous joining of the European 
Economic Community) contrasts with the separate paths that both coun-
tries took regarding nuclear energy. In order to obtain the empirical data 
supporting our analysis, we relied on a number of primary sources from 
public and private archives in Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
We also consulted documentation from supranational bodies such as 
the European Union and the United Nations. Reports from NGOs and 
plenty of national, regional and local newspapers, from both sides of the 
border, also provided excellent sources for our research.
The article structure follows the historical evolution related to three 
phases of transboundary nuclear issues. The first section enquires about 
the collaboration of state, research and industrial actors over the period in 
which two fascist dictatorships shared a common techno-political imagi-
nary – they both understood nuclear energy as a driver of modernity and 
the public was absent from the decision-making process (Pereira, Fonseca 
and Carvalho, 2018). The second section identifies the event that seems 
to mark the beginning of the nuclear mistrust between the two nations: 
the Manzanares spill. Section three covers the second historical phase 
of transboundary relations marked by the advent of democracy in both 
countries and the reconfiguration of nuclear policies: while Portugal 
abandoned nuclear power, Spain implemented a nuclear moratorium 
but kept ten reactors operative. Sections four and five tackle the conflicts 
regarding waste management and uranium mining that arose during 
the last historical phase which started in 1986 and lasts until the present 
time. This last phase was marked by two crucial events that took place in 
1986: both countries joined what was at the time still called the European 
Communities (EC), and the Chernobyl accident. The first event allowed 
Brussels to become a referee on Spanish/Portuguese nuclear disputes. 
The European Union (EU) provides an international framework for the 
resolution of such conflicts, and new supranational legislation was imple-
mented at the European level as a consequence of Chernobyl. Another 
direct consequence of the accident in the Soviet Union is that Portugal 
expanded its institutional vigilance on Spanish nuclear activities. The event 
also led to the consolidation of transboundary social movements against 
nuclear energy. We conclude the article with a summary of our findings.
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The transnational nuclear cooperation phase  
(1950s to 1970s)
In 1958, at the dawn of civil uses of nuclear energy, a British report to the 
Chairman of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA, 
1958) stated that Portugal has recently suggested that Spain should be 
invited “to cooperate technically in the activities of OEEC (Organization 
for European Economic Co-operation) in the field of nuclear energy”. 
Concerned with the rapidly increasing energy needs of the post-World 
War  II European economic recovery, and particularly the possibilities 
presented by nuclear power, the Council of the OEEC (the predecessor 
of the OECD) set up the European Nuclear Energy Agency (ENEA) in 
February 1958. A month earlier, on 10 January 1958, Spain’s Association 
Agreement with the OEEC had been signed. Barely eighteen months later, 
on 20 July 1959, Spain became a full member country of the OEEC and 
the ENEA. By that time the Portuguese had been supplying the Anglo-
American Combined Development Trust with tons of uranium oxide 
for over a decade (Gaspar, 2018). The British considered there would be 
clear advantages for Portugal to cooperate closely with Spain on nuclear 
matters, among other things, because all transport of nuclear material or 
fuel from Portugal to the rest of Europe by land would cross the Spanish 
territory. Moreover, Spain was the only country with which Portugal could 
associate for joint production of nuclear power, as it does not share a land 
border with any other nation. Therefore, the British report concluded, it 
would be desirable for the two countries to coordinate their health and 
safety precautions, and there might be opportunities for joint exploitation 
of uranium deposits near the frontier (UKAEA, 1958). In fact, the Iberian 
Peninsula is among the main European uranium mining regions, together 
with the Czech Republic, East Germany and France (Dahlkamp, 2016; 
for global analysis on uranium trade see Hecht, 2014).
Portugal was aware of significant uranium reserves on its territory 
since 1907. Its exploitation began in 1913, in the mines of Urgeiriça, 
Canas de Senhorim (Viseu) and ore processing infrastructure was also 
built in the area that holds the most important reserves of uranium. 
By the end of World War II, Portugal was the third largest producer of 
uranium concentrates in the West (Oliveira, 2002). In 1949, Portugal 
signed an agreement with England that preceded the beginning of the 
Cold War and encouraged the exploitation of 4,370 tons of uranium 
oxide in sixty-one small mines spread over the districts of Guarda, Viseu 
and Coimbra.
In Spain, access to the country’s uranium and radioactive mineral 
resources was nationalised in 1948 and exporting them was strictly 
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forbidden.2 Like a number of other European countries such as Sweden 
or Denmark (relying on uranium from Greenland) in the age of “techno-
scientific nationalism” (Nielsen and Knudsen, 2013: 237f.) in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, Spanish authorities cherished the idea of a nuclear program 
relying on natural uranium mined domestically. As elsewhere, the idea 
was abandoned in the mid-1960s, when turn-key American light-water 
reactors relying on enriched uranium entered the market.
In line with the British advice mentioned above, Spain and Portugal 
cooperated on nuclear issues throughout the 1960s. The fact that both 
countries were at the time corporatistfascist regimes probably facilitated 
these relations. Both the Portuguese Estado Novo and the Spanish 
Francoist regime enforced nationalist and conservative Roman Catholic 
values on their populations, restricted freedom of speech and association, 
applying censorship to the press and all published material (Gaspar, 2018; 
Saraiva, 2016; Rubio-Varas et at., 2018). Both nations created similar insti-
tutional structures for the development of nuclear civil uses, even with an 
identical name: Junta de Energía Nuclear ( JEN, “Nuclear Energy Board”). 
Both JENs exchanged students and scientists and shared resources (natu-
ral and man-made). In the early 1960s, both countries began to operate 
experimental research reactors (Romero de Pablos and Sanchez Ron, 
2001; Ramalho et a. 1999). By 1968, the two countries provided mutual 
assistance in uranium mining and the fuel cycle, information about nuclear 
plants and high energy physics (ABC, 1968a; ABC, 1968b).
The informal collaboration was made explicit in 1971, when both 
countries signed an agreement for cooperation for the development of 
civil uses of nuclear power (ABC, 1970; ABC, 1971). The agreement 
institutionalised the pre-existent cooperation on nuclear research and 
the exploitation of natural resources, knowledge and installations (BOE, 
1972). Spain had a long experience in such treaties, having been among 
the earliest signatories of bilateral cooperation agreements for civil uses of 
nuclear power – with the US (1955), France (1956), Great Britain (1960), 
Canada and Italy (both in 1965). In line with the rest of the nuclear coop-
eration agreements signed at the time, the text made no reference to safety 
or other shared regulations regarding nuclear power. Before the end of 
the 1970s, Spain signed agreements of nuclear cooperation with Germany 
(1973), India (1973), Argentina (1978), and Mexico (1978) in similar terms.
Collaboration at the political level fostered cooperation in the private 
sector. Following the visit of the Portuguese Minister of Economy to Spain 
2 Decree of December 29, 1948 published in Boletín Oficial del Estado [BOE] 
Nº 19, (Madrid 1949).
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in 1964, governments agreed to create a commission to study the viability 
of a joint nuclear power plant on the southernmost part of the Guadiana 
river, in the area where the river acts as the border, to provide electricity 
for both countries. Two private utilities, Empresa Termoeléctrica Portuguesa 
(ETP)
3
 and the Spanish utility Sevillana de Electricidad carried out the 
study. In 1966, they presented the feasibility study which included technical, 
economic and safety aspects. However, the project never passed the plan-
ning stage and the idea was eventually abandoned.4 As both countries were 
under the rule of a fascist elite, citizens usually were not informed about 
major technological projects, including plans for nuclear development. Like 
in the socialist dictatorships in central Europe, including East Germany, 
discussed in the contribution on the planned nuclear waste depository on 
the inner-German border (Kirchhof, 2018), such a sociopolitical context 
did not permit the emergence of organized anti-nuclear mobilisation.
A couple of years later, the private sector once again took the lead, put-
ting forward plans for a nuclear facility using the Tagus River. Spanish 
private utilities contacted their Portuguese counterparts on the proposal 
for the Almaraz nuclear power plant (NPP), a town in Cáceres Province, 
Extremadura, roughly 100 kilometres from Portugal. For most of 1968 and 
1969, the Portuguese seemed interested in participating in the construction 
and exploitation of Almaraz with a 25 per cent share (Compañía Sevillana de 
Electricidad, 1968). In the end, the Portuguese eventually pulled out. They 
could not find neither financial nor political support to embrace the venture. 
Hence, Almaraz formally took off as an exclusively Spanish project in 1972.
The Manzanares radioactive spill (1970): the first signs 
of mistrust?
So, when did the nuclear controversies begin between the two neighbors? 
The earliest instance of disagreement on nuclear matters between Spain and 
Portugal that we can identify goes back to the early 1970s, due to an under-
reported accident at Spanish JEN installations in Madrid which was finally 
made public after the Portuguese authorities disclosed their measurements.
3 In April 1958, the Portuguese Association of Nuclear Companies (Companhia 
Portuguesa de Indústrias Nucleares, or CPIN) was created. CPIN was a 
joint venture of several companies. In 1964 CPIN sold its assets to Empresa 
Termoeléctrica Portuguesa (ETP)
4 Compañia Sevillana de Electricidad and Empresa Termoelectrica Portuguesa, 
Informe sobre viabilidad de una central Hispano-Portuguesa en el sur de la 
peninsula ibérica, December 1966.
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The events unraveled as follows: in November 1970, during a mainte-
nance operation at JEN-1 experimental reactor and reprocessing center 
headquarters in Madrid, some 300 liters of liquids contaminated by stron-
tium-90 and cesium-137, both radioactive, leaked to the Manzanares river, 
a tributary of the Tagus (Blansfield, 1987a; Díaz Díaz and López Jiménez, 
1993). According to a report in Nuclear Engineering International (1971) 
the leakage amounted to “about one thousand Curies”. The same report 
explains that for months, Spanish nuclear circles quietly commented that 
JEN had been collecting and taking away vast amounts of agricultural 
products, fish, water and mud from the river banks, to be disposed of at El 
Cabril, the mine acting as nuclear waste storage at the time (see Figure 3). 
The “Operación Jarama”, as it was named, “gathered more than 300 barrels of 
radioactive mud and vegetables” (Blansfield, 1987a). Although the press was 
censored, some newspapers in Madrid began to disclose some information 
on the event five months after it took place. In May 1971, seven months after 
the accident, a Spanish JEN official still denied the event in the press: during 
spring and autumn, JEN claimed, levels of radioactivity usually increased in a 
sunny country.5 A few days later, another officer from the Spanish JEN actually 
stated that “a certain abnormal – but not dangerous – increase of radioactiv-
ity was detected in November in the Manzanares, Jarama and Tagus rivers” 
(Nuclear Engineering International, 1971). However, on 15 May the Spanish 
weekly magazine Sábado Gráfico reported that the amount of radioactivity 
released in less than one month in the Jarama and Tagus rivers seemed to be 
“between 100 and 1000 times higher than the normal waste produced by a 
nuclear power station in the same period of time”. By then, the Portuguese JEN 
announced they had detected the contamination downstream in the Tagus 
river in Portugal (Nuclear Engineering International, 1971). Only after that an 
official statement from the Spanish JEN disclosed the accident, almost half a 
year after it occurred.
The official statement by the Spanish JEN declared that the combina-
tion of technical (a broken pipe) and human errors (a safety valve con-
necting the facilities with the city sewer system, that should be closed, was 
inexplicably open) caused 40 litres of liquid containing diluted fission 
products to end up in the river. JEN estimated that direct radiation was 
close to null, and only in specific spots along the Manzanares, Jarama and 
Tagus the radiation was above normal (Carrión, 1971).6
5 ABC, 2nd May 1971. This statement is also reported in the piece in Nuclear 
Engineering International (1971) with an expressive “Spain is different!”.
6 45 years later we contacted by email Ignacio Carrión, the journalist who was 
responsible for the report. “What I do remember is that a certain solemnity 
was given to my visit, as if it were not a Nuclear Center but rather less than 
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As this episode unravelled, the two countries were in the process of nego-
tiating and signing the first cooperation agreement for the development 
of civil uses of nuclear power mentioned above. Interestingly, safety issues 
were excluded from the agreement. But for the first time a Portuguese 
action (the official disclosure of information long denied) had an effect 
on the other side of the border (forcing transparency on the Spanish side).
Democratisation and the new actors (1974-1986)
By the mid-1970s, both dictatorships came to an end almost simultane-
ously but in rather different fashions. In Portugal, in April 1974, the fascist 
dictatorship was overthrown by the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) in 
a coup d’état known worldwide as the Carnation Revolution. In Spain, 
the dictator died in his bed in November 1975, triggering a period known 
as the Democratic Transition. In both cases the end of the authoritarian 
rule had strong implications for the nuclear endeavour. On both sides of 
the border, antinuclear movements that started as grassroots local move-
ments managed to gain resonance at the national level and paved the way 
for the first environmental movements (Barca and Delicado, 2016; Costa 
Morata, 2009; Santos Pereira, Fonseca and Carvalho, 2018). Although, at 
least in Spain, some local and regional protests of environmental nature 
had taken place during the dictatorship (Corral Broto, 2016), the advent of 
democracy substantially transformed political ecologies in both countries, 
leading to the emergence of environmental social groups.
As elsewhere in Western Europe, transnational links and transfers rang-
ing from nuclear knowledge to protest culture and tactics were important 
for the nascent Iberian movements (Kirchhof and Meyer, 2014; Tompkins, 
2016a and 2016b; Milder, 2017). During the demonstrations against the 
only Portuguese commercial nuclear power project at Ferrel, especially 
during the Festival for Life and Against Nuclear of 1978, the Portuguese 
antinuclear movement benefited from the expertise and experience of envi-
ronmental activists from Western Europe. A large number of Portuguese 
activists and scientists became familiar with environmental protests and 
concerns while studying in France (Barca and Delicado, 2016), and vari-
ous Spanish activists came to Portugal to support their Iberian friends.
Yet – despite the importance of these movements that made the public 
aware of the problematic sides of nuclear power, eventually it was structural 
constraints, and not necessarily antinuclear movements, that undermined 
one of the dependencies of the Palacio del Pardo [i.e. the residence of General 
Franco]” (personal communication). 
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the viability of nuclear power for both Portugal (UNDP/World Bank, 
1984; Gaspar, 2018; Santos Pereira, Fonseca and Carvalho, 2018) and Spain 
(Rubio-Varas et al., 2018) – the former halting nuclear energy entirely, the 
later restraining it to ten reactors after the nuclear moratorium of 1984.
What is relevant for our purposes here is how democratisation and 
the subsequent change of nuclear policies affected transnational and 
trans-border issues. Democratisation led to a new set of institutions to 
deal with nuclear issues, a process intended to reshape the institutional 
structures in accordance with the new political rule. This coincided 
with an international shift towards institutionally separating promo-
tion and research from the regulation of safety, to allow for independ-
ent supervision of the growing commercial nuclear power sector and 
to avoid conflicts of interests. Following British and US examples, 
where the Atomic Energy Commissions were split or abolished in 1971 
respectively 1975 ( Josephson, 2018; Butler and Bud, 2018), the twin 
institutions that had led nuclear development in both countries dur-
ing the dictatorships – the JENs –, were subsequently abolished and 
replaced by newly created bodies concerned with either safety issues or 
research.7 In 1979, Portugal created the Gabinete de Protecção e Segurança 
Nuclear (GPSN -the Safety Assessment Office). Nuclear energy, instead 
of playing a fundamental role in the definition of national energy poli-
cies, progressively became a matter of concern. In Spain, the Parliament 
approved in 1980 the law creating the CSN (Nuclear Safety Council) 
for nuclear safety and radiation protection as an independent public 
body – without any promotion function – which operates in Spain 
since 1981. Despite this institutional reshuffle, most of the experts from 
JEN remained as employees of CSN and GPSN. The main difference 
is that the new institutions now responded to democratically elected 
parliaments, regional and local authorities, and to the public in general. 
Since its creation, CSN’s main objectives included timely information 
of both the parliament and the public.
The newly created bodies were to carry out the agreements that would 
mark the nuclear relationships until the entrance of both countries in the 
European Communities (EC) in January 1986. On the one hand, a Protocol 
for Cooperation in Nuclear Safety was signed among GPSN and JEN (later 
transferred to the CSN) as well as the Luso-Spanish Agreement for the Safety 
of Border Nuclear Installations, which was signed in Lisbon in March of 1980 
7 The Portuguese JEN was closed in 1979 by the following law: Decreto-Lei 
nº 361/79 de 1 de setembro – Formalização da extinção da Junta de Energia 
Nuclear. The Spanish JEN slowly mutated into the CIEMAT officially created 
in 1986, in the making since 1983, Romero de Pablos Sánchez Ron (2001).
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and ratified by the respective Parliaments in 1981 (CSN/IS/1/81:28). A first 
of its kind between the two countries, the agreement defined border nuclear 
facilities as those installations (reactors, nuclear fuel factories, nuclear waste 
sites and reprocessing facilities) “siting at a distance of less than 30 kilometres 
from the border line between both countries, or any other distance interna-
tionally defined and accepted by both parties”. Both countries agreed, for 
ten years, to:8
• warn the neighbouring country with sufficient notice of any inten-
tion to build, operate or exploit any such facility;
• provide comments and observations both on the authorisation 
process and during the operation of the installations (which had to 
be addressed by the liable country);
• establish in their territories the necessary systems to detect 
 radioactivity levels and to mutually inform in the event of an emer-
gency that could have implications for the other country.
• Respect the restrictions established by any of the parties concer-
ning the secrecy of provided reports and documents regarding 
 installations, technical process, conditions of exploitation and 
commercial relations.
Beyond the aforementioned commitments, competent authorities of the 
building country would keep the competent authorities of the neigh-
bouring country informed of any significant incidents at other nuclear 
facilities that may affect their territory.
In order to enforce the agreement, a binational Permanent Technical 
Commission (PTC) was created, in charge of organising meetings at least 
once a year. Composed of members of the CSN and the GPSN, the PTC 
met twice in 1981, in September and December (CSN/IS/1/81: 28). In 
both occasions, the main issues were the Portuguese comments and obser-
vations on the Spanish authorisation for Sayago’s nuclear power plant, the 
only border installation according to the definition in the transboundary 
agreement, since it was just off the Portuguese border in a small village 
south of the Douro river (see Figure 1). The project of Sayago’s nuclear 
plant was submitted for approval in 1973 by the Spanish largest electric-
ity company – Iberdurero – and the government initial permission was 
granted in 1975.
8 Acuerdo sobre Cooperación en materia de Seguridad de las instalaciones nucleares 
fronterizas entre España y la República de Portugal [Agreement on Security 
Cooperation of border nuclear facilities between Spain and the Republic of 
Portugal], “BOE” núm. 196, de 17/8/1981, pp. 18859-18860.
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The town mayor recalls that in 1976 and 1978 two agreements with the 
utility specified the economic benefits the village would get in return: (La 
Opinion de Zamora, 2008): “Iberduero and the City Council reached 
an agreement. If the project did not materialize, the land would revert 
to the City Council. The benefits offered by the then Iberduero included 
the sanitation and the public lighting for the town, as well as the develop-
ment of two workshop schools which were all materialised”. In line with 
the promise of prosperity to nuclear communities, which had accompa-
nied nuclear power from the very beginning (Brown, 2013), the catalog 
of projects was much broader: construction of a new Town Hall, Rural 
Hygiene Center, sports hall, swimming pool, extension of the cemetery… 
All in exchange for the land to build the nuclear plant on, which was yet 
awaiting final authorisation by the Government.
These plans coincided with the early anti-nuclear mobilisations in 
Portugal, against the Ferrel nuclear plant. Anti-nuclear groups organised 
two important events against the Sayago project: during the International 
Day Against Nuclear Tests, in 1979, coordinated by the antinuclear com-
mittee of Lisbon, several activities directed against nuclear energy were 
put in place, such as debates, conferences on energy issues, exhibitions 
and concerts. The Portuguese antinuclear movement was against both 
nuclear weapons and energy (Santos Pereira, Fonseca and Carvalho, 
2018). Two years later, ties across the border had been established and 
the Spanish side became involved; in June 1981 there was an anti-nuclear 
festival in Miranda do Douro, 15 kilometres from Sayago, in June 1981 
was supported by local authorities from both sides of the border, as well 
as both Portuguese and Spanish environmental groups (Guimarães and 
Fernandes, 2016; Madeira, 2016).
The comments by the Portuguese government were to be considered 
in the pending authorisations by the Spanish authorities (CSN/IS/2/82: 
39). Even if the Sayago nuclear power plant never obtained the final 
authorisation to be built, the preparatory works at the site were well 
advanced, the reactor vessel had been built by ENSA in Santander and 
the financing for a reactor manufactured by Westinghouse had been 
guaranteed by the Export-Import Bank (Rubio-Varas and De la Torre, 
2017). Yet it is premature to conclude that the fate of Sayago was primarily 
due to Portuguese objections. With the arrival of the Socialist Party to 
the Spanish Government, in 1982, Iberduero froze the project. All that 
is known is that at the time of the Spanish moratorium of 1984, Sayago 
NPP was excluded from compensations to the utilities, since the plant 
never obtained the final authorisation, in contrast with the five reactors 
officially halted by the moratorium. In Spain, the number of unconcluded 
nuclear projects is more than double the number of reactors that were 
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eventually connected to the grid, as shown in Figure 1 above, with seven of 
the anticipated almost thirty reactors being located within 100 kilometres 
of the Portuguese border.
Within the framework of the Agreement on the Safety of Border 
Nuclear Installations, throughout the first half of the 1980s there were 
technical visits by the Portuguese to other Spanish installations close to 
the border (but not so close as to be defined as border installations by the 
agreement), namely to the building sites of Almaraz and Valdecaballeros 
NPP, and the fuel factory of ENUSA in Salamanca (CSN/IS/2/82: 39). 
There were exchanges of personnel between GPSN and the CSN, plans 
to collaborate to study the radioactivity in the Tagus river, and talks about 
opportunities for future collaboration, given that the Portuguese energy 
plan of 1984 still included nuclear plants, even if the plan was yet pending 
approval (CSN/IS/6/84: 68).
With the Sayago project abandoned and Valdecaballeros NPP para-
lysed by the Spanish nuclear moratorium of 1984, most of the activity 
of the binational PTC focused on the vigilance of Almaraz NPP after 
Chernobyl’s accident. This nuclear station is located about 100 kilometres 
(60 miles) from the Portuguese border (see Figure 1). After Chernobyl, 
that distance seemed far too close from the Portuguese border. The two 
reactors of the plant make use of the Tagus River for its cooling needs, 
which flows right into Portugal’s economic heart and capital city, Lisbon. 
A meeting on nuclear emergencies was organised in July 1986, and the 
GPSN representatives were invited to the emergency drills at Almaraz 
later that year, while the GPSN requested information on the Spanish 
part to prepare a model to simulate potential leakages on the Tagus river 
(CSN/IS/11/86: 108).
In parallel, in Portugal massive public demonstrations against the 
Ferrel power plant in 1976 compromised the political viability of nuclear 
energy – by the late 1980s the focus shifted towards an increase in natural 
gas production, and during the early 2000s towards renewable energy 
sources (Estanqueiro et al., 2008). In 1987, Portugal decided to abandon 
its nuclear plans forever. From then onwards, Portugal expanded its 
institutional vigilance on Spanish nuclear affairs. During the 1990s there 
were a number of initiatives that illustrate this trend in Portugal, such 
as the creation of the Council for Nuclear Accidents and Radiological 
Emergences in 1994, the development of a Technical Group for Nuclear 
Emergencies in 1997, and the creation of a Commission for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety in 1998 (Oliveira, 2002). The remaining 
paper shows evidence of the change in the transboundary nuclear rela-
tions that take place after 1986, in vivid contrast with the previous three 
decades of friendly and cooperative relations between Portugal and Spain. 
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Such a change in diplomatic relations between neighbours on the issue 
of nuclear installations at the border is remarkably similar to the change 
in international relations between Denmark – once it had given up its 
nuclear plans – and Sweden, which continued to rely on nuclear power, 
discussed in the relevant contribution to this special issue (Kaijser and 
Meyer, 2018b).
Siting waste at the border
In 1987, the Spanish government approved the First Nuclear Waste Plan as 
submitted by the National Company of Radioactive Waste Management 
(ENRESA by its Spanish acronym). The Spanish Parliament created 
ENRESA three years earlier, in 1984, as a public, non-profit organisation 
responsible for the management of radioactive waste. Spain’s National 
Waste Plan charged ENRESA with searching for suitable sites for nuclear 
waste storage, since spent fuel remained stored at fuel pools at the nuclear 
power plants. As the contribution to this special issue on the Gorleben 
nuclear waste site aptly demonstrates (Kirchhof, 2018), the waste issue 
remained unsolved across the European Communities (EC). In 1985, the 
first European Research Framework Programme supported research in 
the field of radioactive waste management in which Spain participated, 
most notably in the actions related to safety of geological waste disposal 
(Finzi, 1989). According to the Call document (European Commission, 
1985), at least two pilot underground facilities focused on testing and 
demonstrating processes in different geological formations were already 
underway in the EC at the time: the Asse salt mine in the Federal Republic 
of Germany (HAW project) (Kirchhof, 2018; Tiggemann, 2004) and the 
argillaceous layer located under the Mol nuclear site in Belgium (HADES 
project). The Spanish ENRESA had presented a plan to the EC for a 
subterranean pilot installation to study the behaviour of granite as an 
isolator. In November 1986 it received a 5.5US$ million grant under the 
European COST Action programme (Blansfield, 1987b). The project 
name was Instalación Piloto Experimental Subterráneo (IPES by its Spanish 
acronym). The IPES project was exposed to the public as it was included 
in the First Nuclear Waste Plan for Radioactive Waste approved by the 
Government in 1987.
The site for the IPES was Aldeadávila de la Ribera, a village located in 
the basin of the International Douro river (for 112 kilometres, this trans-
boundary river shared between Spain and Portugal represents the natural 
and political border between both countries, see Figure 3). The location 
was chosen because the high walls of granite carved by the river would 
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facilitate access to deep granite formations from the river banks. The site, 
on the outskirts of the village, was located on land owned by the Spanish 
largest private utility Iberduero (Blansfield, 1987b). The exact location 
was four kilometres from Portuguese territory. The Douro River at the 
time was providing water for roughly half of the 10 million Portuguese 
(see Figure 1). ENRESA’s plan to install a laboratory for fuel disposal 
experiments unleashed a torrent of protests in the region, on both sides 
of the border.
By then, the Spanish province of Salamanca already hosted other 
nuclear industries, such as the uranium mines of Saelices el Chico since 
1975, and the neighboring uranium fuel factory in Juzbado, since 1985 (see 
Figure 3). This last facility had already mobilised thousands of protesters 
in the early 1980s (2,500 people according to El Pais, 17 June 1980), with-
out managing to stop it, with the Anti-Nuclear Committee of Salamanca 
(Spanish name, CAS) leading the protests on the Spanish side and the 
Portuguese antinuclear movement joining forces from early on. The news 
of a waste pilot plant therefore added fuel to the antinuclear movement 
in the region, leading to street protests in the area.
In opposition at the time at the national level, the Spanish party of the 
right, the Partido Popular, seized the opportunity and tried to line up 
with this anti-nuclear sentiment to criticise the socialist party. The con-
troversy came to a head when the vice-president of the Provincial Council 
of Salamanca, Luis Calvo Rengel, from the Socialist party, was detained 
by local protesters in the Town Hall of Aldeadávila during 30 long hours 
between April 2 and 3 1987. Although he went to Aldeadávilla to show his 
solidary with the protesters, he was held hostage in an attempt to pressure 
ENRESA to discard the project, and his release was only secured after 
the intervention of the police.
A few weeks later, coinciding with Chernobyl’s first anniversary, on 
April 26 1987, a rally in Aldeadávila de la Ribera got over 10,000 people 
from both sides of the border attending. Spanish and Portuguese anti-
nuclear groups and media invoked regional identities to legitimate their 
cause: a columnist commented that the rally constituted “a true rite of 
identity for the [Salamanca] region”.9 This is not a unique trace of the 
Iberian antinuclear movements, as other European antinuclear groups 
have frequently drawn on regional identity since the 1970s (Meyer, 2019). 
A couple of weeks later, about 30,000 Spanish and Portuguese marched 
9 Municipal website of Cabeza del Caballo, “Hace 23 años…” http://www.
cabezadelcaballo.org/verNoticiaAction.do?id=165 (last accessed on 2 October 
2018).
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in the university town of Salamanca, located halfway between the border 
and Madrid, under the slogan “We want hospitals, culture and pro-
gress – we don’t want to be Europe’s nuclear waste dump”.
The rejection of the IPES received support from other actors besides 
social movements: the Senate of the University of Salamanca, the oldest 
in Spain, approved an institutional statement in which it expressed “its 
most resounding rejection of the aforementioned project, while defining 
its non-participation in research programs that imply the development or 
consolidation of this nuclear laboratory project” (El País, 18 June 1987). 
On the Portuguese side, anti-nuclear groups at the local level managed to 
obtain the support of important societal actors such as the Catholic Church. 
This is remarkable, because elsewhere in Europe, for instance in Germany, 
the Catholic Church and its hierarchy were more hesitant to support anti-
nuclear protests, while Protestant pastors were often very involved in the 
anti-nuclear movement (Schüring, 2015; Schramm, 2018). The blessing of 
the church reinforced the credibility and legitimacy of their claims about the 
impact of the nuclear threat. The Bishop of Bragança, D. António Rafael, 
pleaded his congregation to pray against the IPES, and asked the Holy Lady 
of Douro to keep the Spanish nuclear threat far away from the Douro river 
(Ambiente em Movimento, 2017b). Eventually a statue of the Holy Lady was 
strategically placed at Penedo Durao in 2002, a place for praying for the river.
ENRESA’s spokesman repeatedly insisted on the experimental nature of 
the installation and guaranteed that it would never become a waste disposal 
facility (ENERESA, 1988). But social movement pressure continued and 
so did Portuguese diplomatic action, both at the bilateral level, through 
direct contacts with the Spanish government and at the multilateral level, 
through the mediation of the Council of the European Union. Six months 
later, in October 1987, the Spanish government officially abandoned the 
IPES project (ENRESA, 1988). The announcement was received with 
satisfaction by the affected populations on both sides of the border. The 
Portuguese Government stressed that the end of the construction of the 
nuclear laboratory by the Spanish Executive eliminated the only dispute 
that could disturb the atmosphere of the planned Iberian summit between 
Prime Ministers Felipe González and Cavaco Silva. This could serve as an 
indication that friendly relations were more important in times of democ-
racy than pushing through nuclear ambitions/solving waste issue. A member 
of the Socialist Spanish government at the time, Javier Solana, attributed 
the abandonment of the “project exclusively to financing problems by the 
European Community”, but Lisbon preferred to see in the decision a result 
of the pressures exerted by the Portuguese authorities and by the public 
opinion of both countries (El País, 1987). At the Portuguese Parliament, 
the demise of the IPES project was considered a diplomatic victory, and a 
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Portuguese MP praised the “success of the energetic diplomatic action of the 
Government of Professor Cavaco Silva, who managed to protect the Douro 
river from the nuclear threat” (Diário da Assembleia da República, 1987).
Eleven years later, in 1998, demonstrations returned following a 
complaint made by the Antinuclear and Environmentalist Committee 
of Salamanca, claiming the border area was again under consideration 
as a possible storage site. The Association of Municipalities of Trás-os-
Montes and Alto Douro (Portugal) promoted a march on foot by the 
riverbank inside the Portuguese Douro International area. Spanish and 
Portuguese citizens wanted to draw attention to the fact that Aldeadávila 
was inside an international conservation unit: a natural park. At the ori-
gin of this objection was the law under discussion in the Spanish Senate, 
which would give full authority to Spain’s National Radioactive Waste 
Company-ENRESA to select the location of a nuclear waste site. The 
Spanish Government, through ENRESA, attempted since then to find 
a solution for the nuclear waste storage.
The proximity issue of siting waste at the border played a key role. In 
fact, some of the Portuguese mayors of Bragança district, near the border, 
suggested that the appropriate decision would be to find a location closer to 
where nuclear energy is used, like Catalonia or Madrid (Fernandes, Barca 
and Meira, 2018). While the mayors were indeed making an environmental 
justice argument about the territorial environmental justice between ben-
eficiaries and affected citizens, they would not have made such a claim had 
the planned repository be sited on the other side of the Peninsula. To be 
sure, Portuguese institutions have never interfered when similar conflicts 
have arisen in other parts of the Peninsula further away from the border, 
such as in El Cabril or at the selected site for the Centralised Temporary 
Storage facility for nuclear waste (ATC) in Guadalajara (see Figure 3).
The end of Portuguese nuclear ambitions in 1987 and the experience 
of Chernobyl reinforced the transboundary networks between activists 
and social movements, as the Aldeadávila case above illustrates. From 
the Portuguese side the focus was now on attempting to undermine the 
Spanish nuclear program, motivated by concerns with nuclear plants close 
to the Portuguese border. In November 2015, the transnational Iberian 
Antinuclear Movement (MIA in Portuguese and Spanish) was established, 
comprising Spanish and Portuguese Activists. It aims at closing Iberian 
nuclear plants but also deals with nuclear waste management and uranium 
mining, thus reflecting historical transnational concerns that have affected 
Iberian nuclear issues. António Eloy, a leading Portuguese antinuclear 
activist who played a fundamental role during the Ferrel controversy, is 
still active forty years after the first protests, serving as the Portuguese 
coordinator of MIA.
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In December 2016, the Spanish government announced their plans to 
authorise the building of a nuclear waste depot at the Almaraz nuclear 
plant (see Figure 1). The two reactors at Almaraz, operating since 1982 and 
1984, were about to initiate the process of requesting extensions to con-
tinue working beyond year 2022 and 2024, respectively after the expiration 
of their original forty-year license.10 The government in Lisbon contended 
that Madrid violated a 2014 European directive requiring countries to 
“initiate consultations” on “potential transboundary repercussions” to the 
environment in their public projects, namely the directive on directive on 
Environmental Impact Assessments (European Union, 2014). Following 
several protests on the streets, in January 2017, Portugal filed an official 
complaint to EU authorities. At the same time, Portugal’s Parliament 
voted unanimously (all members of Parliament, from all parties, left to 
right) to call for the closure of Almaraz nuclear power plant. Madrid 
dismissed the complaint and remained adamant that construction would 
press ahead as scheduled. In February 2017, due to the initiative of EU 
President Jean-Claude Juncker, Spain and Portugal reached an amicable 
settlement. According to the EU statement (2017), under the auspices of 
European Commission officials, Lisbon was to withdraw its complaint 
as long as Spain postponed its plans to construct the waste storage facil-
ity until Portuguese officials had conducted their own inspection of the 
structural plans. As a result, a “working group” was commissioned in 
April to assess the potential transnational impact of the Almaraz reposi-
tory, including members of the Portuguese Environmental Agency, the 
National Department of Health and the National Society of Engineers. 
The report stated that the repository was “safe” and its construction was 
“adequate” but recommended that Portugal should be able to accompany 
the various stages of the project (Ferreira, 2017). The president of the 
Portuguese Environment Agency stated that “significant transboundary 
impacts are not estimated in normal warehouse conditions nor in the 
event of severe accidents” (Ferreira, 2017).
Despite of the governmental agreement, environmental groups such as 
Quercus, anti-nuclear activists, politicians and lay citizens reignited the 
nuclear controversy in Portugal (Silva, 2017). In fact, the MIA announced, 
in the same month of April, the organisation of a demonstration in 
Madrid, under the slogan “Closing Almaraz and every other Plant!” 
(Figure 2). The event took place on June 10th 2017, when over 125 envi-
ronmental organizations from both countries, with the full endorsement 
10 The utilities owning the plant initiated the bureaucratic process in June 2017, 
by presenting the information required three years before the expiring date 
(Foro Nuclear, 2017).
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of green parties both sides of the border, marched against Almaraz and 
the Spanish nuclear endeavor (Yuste, 2017; Esquerda Net, 2017). Carla 
Graça, from the Portuguese branch of MIA, stated that:
Until we reach our goal, we will join our voice to the voices of our Spanish 
brothers and we will keep on shouting and singing: “Closing Almaraz and 
every other Plant!” (Graça, 2017: 61)
Despite its initial reaction, the Portuguese government attempted to 
close the controversy based on technical arguments, thus attempting to 
silence public dissent. If, from the standpoint of the government, the 
controversy reached its “closure”, it is expected that during the next few 
months and years Almaraz NPP will remain a breeding ground for the 
dissemination of confrontational and combative relationships between 
politicians, science and society, highlighting the perils and vulnerabilities 
of what Callon et al. designate as “double delegation” (Callon et al., 2009) 
– the delegation of political or administrative issues on elected officials 
and civil servants and the delegation of technical issues on scientists and 
experts – especially when related to nuclear issues.
Mining uranium at borders
It is interesting to note that the mining of uranium was not explicitly 
included in the Luso-Spanish Agreement on the Safety of Border Nuclear 
Installations of 1980, despite the fact that most uranium deposits of the 
Peninsula lie on both sides of the border (see Figure 3). In fact, for social 
movements – worldwide – uranium mining remains entangled with 
civil and military uses of nuclear power, which they have been fiercely 
opposing (Kirchhof, 2014). If the antinuclear protests in Ferrel during 
the 1970s led to the emergence of the first environmental movements in 
Portugal, the actions of former workers and uranium miners shed light 
on the inability of the Portuguese State to deal with environmental and 
health risks, becoming the latest chapter of cross-border nuclear issues 
and the most recent display of Iberian antinuclear activism.
As previously mentioned, Portugal mined uranium since World War I. 
However, from 1977 the mines were nationalised and the active and 
decommissioned mines in the country were placed under the exclusive 
control of the state-owned Empresa Nacional do Urânio (ENU, National 
Uranium Company). The process to dissolve ENU began in 2001, leav-
ing behind large social and environmental liabilities. This gave rise to the 
fight for compensation and the organisation of anti-uranium groups and 
numerous protests throughout the country (Fenandez et al., 2018). Some 
of the anti-uranium groups created included, for instance, “(Former) and 
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Present workers of ENU”, focused on labor and social rights, and the 
“Commission of Inhabitants of the Residential Area of ENU”, mostly 
concerned with radiation levels around the mines (Araújo and Mendes, 
2013:87). The Association Environment in Uranium-rich Areas-AZU (in 
Portuguese Associação Ambiente em Zonas Uraníferas-AZU ) was founded 
in 2002, comprising former miners and inhabitants of affected areas. Its 
main goal was the development of an epidemiological study to assess the 
role of uranium mining on the incidence of cancer and the implementation 
of the Decree-Law n.º 198-A/2001, which established that the Portuguese 
State was responsible for compensations linked to environmental and 
health consequences of the mining industry in Portugal (Ambiente em 
Movimento, 2017).
These groups opposing uranium mining strengthened both the 
Portuguese and the Iberian antinuclear movement, literally embodying the 
grim consequences of nuclear energy, reinforcing the idea that, from the soci-
etal perspective, antinuclear movements do not separate uranium mining, 
nuclear power plants and waste disposal. These victims had to resort to their 
“contaminated bodies”, emotions and ethical issues in an attempt to influence 
politicians and public opinion (Mendes and Araújo, 2011). However, these 
mobilisations never attained the same national and international attention 
as the Ferrel protests. After various demonstrations and decades of struggle, 
Figure 3: Uranium mines and fuel cycle facilities in Portugal and Spain (1950s-2018)
Source: Own elaboration. Portuguese abandoned mines from Santos Oilveira et al. (2002). Spanish mining 
zones from Junta de Energía Nuclear (1969). Note none of the mines are currently exploited. The IPES 
project was never built (see text). The ATC site remains politically blocked.
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compensations were approved and regulated by the Portuguese Parliament 
in February 2016, to be claimed by families of those who died of cancer 
(including bone, lung and lymphatic cancer) (Ropio 2016).
A new transboundary conflict emerged due to the intention to reopen 
uranium mines on the Spanish side. On July 16, 2008, the Australian 
company Berkeley Resources Ltd announced that it had been chosen 
by ENUSA as that company’s partner to conduct a feasibility study to 
develop ENUSA’s uranium mining assets in Salamanca Province, Spain. 
Previously, the Spanish Council of Ministers approved the co-operation 
agreement with ENUSA, given that the latter is the public company 
in charge of manufacturing and handling nuclear fuel to power plants 
in Spain and internationally. In December 2010, Berkeley Resources 
announced their intention to reopen the uranium mine in Retortillo, 
40 kilometres from Portugal (see Figure 3). If inaugurated, it would be the 
only open-cast uranium mine in Western Europe. The echo of the explo-
sions in the nuclear reactors of Fukushima in Japan arrived to Salamanca 
and the plans to restart uranium mining in the zone from 2012 onwards 
were delayed, as confirmed by the Australian company Berkeley Resources 
(El País, 2 May 2011).
Once the feasibility studies confirmed the technical and economic 
viability of the project, in 2013, the bureaucratic process to obtain the 
necessary permissions from regional and national companies was initi-
ated. Meanwhile, the social movement’s campaign against the reopening 
of the mines gained momentum. The public platform against the uranium 
mine in Salamanca (Plataforma contra la mina de uranio de Salamanca) 
‘Stop Uranium’ described the approval of the Environmental Impact 
Statement in 2013 as an “environmental nightmare” (WISE, 2018). In 
parallel, the Portuguese ecologist Party “Os Verdes” presented a petition 
to the Portuguese Parliament questioning the ongoing licensing pro-
cess of a uranium mine project. The Platform Stop Uranium collected 
the statements of the president of the Duero River Basin Authority 
(Confederación Hidrográfica del Duero), José Valín Alonso, who 
considered that Berkeley’s project in Retortillo was “unsustainable and 
environmentally unsound”. In addition, Stop Uranium referred to the 
report issued by the CSN, which qualified the waste from the mining 
operation and the processing plant of the project Retortillo-Santidad as 
“radioactive”, requiring a “joint and inseparable” radiological assessment 
of both facilities (WISE, 2018). The claim was accepted and delayed the 
procedure for one year, given the need to carry out a new assessment.
The project has faced local, regional and transboundary opposition 
ever since. Early in 2014, a round table on the theme “Uranium mining in 
Salamanca. Health effects: the Portuguese experience”, organized by the 
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Spanish ecologist Party-EQUO and by the “Platform Stop Uranium” was 
attended by members of the Association of Former Workers of Uranium 
Mines and the Association of Uranium Mining Areas. In March 2014, 
the environmentalist parties EQUO of Spain and Os Verdes of Portugal 
filed a joint complaint in Brussels to “paralyse” the project. They said the 
project violated several European laws. Despite of this and the pending 
report from CSN, in April 2014, Berkeley obtained a Mining License valid 
for an initial period of thirty years, renewable for two additional periods 
of thirty years. CSN approved the Radiological Analytical study for the 
project over a year later, in September 2015. The National Court declared 
admissible an appeal against the authorization given by the Ministry of 
Industry. The appeal was lodged by EQUO and Ecologistas en Acción. 
(El País, 28 April 2016).
Activists continued to make use of legislative action as well as protests, 
signature collections, road blockades, etc. (WISE, 2018) and eventually by 
2017 the European Commission opened an investigation in order to assess 
whether the project complied with various provisions of European Union 
legislation, including the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive 
and the Habitats Directive.
The investigation was opened “following several complaints and writ-
ten questions”, said the European Commissioner for the Environment, 
Karmenu Vella. The European Commission also recalled in its written 
reply that Spain had not fulfilled its obligation to properly inform Brussels 
of such a project. Uranium mining is an operation which falls under the 
scope of Article 37 of the Euratom Treaty of 1957 and therefore obliges 
the licensing Member State to submit all relevant information. “The 
Commission has reminded Spain of this obligation”, said the reply, dated 
26 June (El País, 5 July 2017). But none of that stopped the uranium mine 
project which was now due to start works by 2018.
On 24 February 2018, approximately three thousand people from 
Portugal and Spain participated in a demonstration in Salamanca (Spain) 
against the potential construction of the uranium pit mine (Esquerda.
Net, 2018; EFE, 2018). The Portuguese former uranium miners marched 
along, providing antinuclear movement with embodied examples and 
narratives of the dangers of uranium exploitation (see Figure 4).
The Portuguese Minister of the Environment, Matos Fernandes, 
requested a meeting with the Spanish government in late March 2018, and 
two Portuguese MEPs (members of the European Parliament), Marisa 
Matias (Left Block) and Ana Gomes (Socialist Party), along with a Spanish 
MEP Xabier Benito Ziluag (GUE/NGL), posed a parliamentary question 
to the European Commission requiring a written answer, which stated 
the following (EU Parliament, 2018):
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In 2015, the Commission gave its assent to the construction of Europe’s 
biggest open-cast uranium mine, in Retortillo (…) close to the Spain-
Portugal border. (…) It is a threat to the environment and the health of 
the residents on either side of the border, and we need serious, transparent 
and informative studies on the potential impact of the mine.
1. Does the Commission know whether studies, including those provi-
ded for in Directive 2011/92/EU and in the Euratom Treaty, were 
carried out to assess the impact that building the mine would have?
2. If they were, what were the results?
3. In order to guarantee to EU citizens that it has protected their inte-
rests with regard to both the environment and their health, can the 
Commission make available the information and documents that 
it has on this process?
So, a decade after its initial announcement, the project still lingers. 
This is the last of the transboundary nuclear conflicts between the 
two countries, illustrating once again the common pattern of nuclear 
transboundary controversies in the Iberian Peninsula that emerged only 
after 1986: a Spanish nuclear related project is developed or announced; 
Portuguese anti-nuclear groups (often with the collaboration of their 
Spanish counterparts) are mobilising, drawing public attention to the 
issue; the Portuguese government is forced to react due to public pressure, 
demanding information from Spanish authorities; the case is brought to 
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the attention of the European Commission (a supranational third party) 
that acts as a mediator, eventually leading to the reconsideration of the 
Spanish initial project under Portuguese supervision, the delay or even 
the abandonment of the project at stake.
Conclusions
Spain and Portugal share a long nuclear history which includes the rela-
tions of institutions, private companies and environmental movements, 
concurring with the transnational dimension of nuclear projects and 
ontologies. We contend that a history of nuclear border issues must con-
sider the role of social movements and collaborations between antinuclear 
groups at the Iberian and international levels. Such an approach allows 
us to analyse how these nuclear controversies were fundamental in the 
development of new forms of public accountability and engagement with 
science and technology, since, at least in the Portuguese case, the Ferrel 
NPP controversy led to a new style of science/society couplings (Santos 
Pereira, Fonseca and Carvalho, 2018). The Iberian nuclear history can be 
analysed according to three distinct phases marked by the institutions and 
social movements that lead the nuclear realm in both countries, encom-
passing various aspects of the nuclear industry, such as uranium mining, 
fuel fabrication, reactors and waste siting.
The first phase (1950s-1974) was one of collaboration between the 
two fascist regimes, and was only compromised by the Manzanares 
river accident, which was only recognised by the Spanish authorities 
after their Portuguese counterparts revealed they had detected radiation 
downstream on the Tagus river. During this time the two countries had 
ambitions to build nuclear power and both cooperated towards this 
effort. The 1971 agreement was for cooperation “for the development” of 
civil nuclear power. The most ambitious cooperation plan was to build 
power stations together, siting them at the border being the natural 
option to serve both electricity grids. Domestically, it was argued that 
these nuclear facilities would also lead to job creation, which would 
benefit these economically deprived regions, and in both countries 
nuclear energy was profoundly intertwined with ideas and imaginaries 
of “modernity” and “development” (Puig, 2005; Santos Pereira, Carvalho 
and Fonseca, 2017).
Two joint nuclear proposals, one in 1966 and that of Almaraz two 
years later did not come to fruition due to the difficulties to find financial 
resources and political support on the Portuguese side. The Portuguese 
response to the Tagus leakage of 1970 comes across as rather soft taking 
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the long-term perspective on the matter. The fact that Portugal had its 
own nuclear aspirations at the time may justify the absence of a more 
energetic response.
The second phase (1974-1986) remained a collaborative one at the 
institutional level. Both countries reshaped their nuclear institutional 
structures in accordance with the new political reality, transforming 
JEN into CSN and GPSN, organizations that are more regulators than 
promoters of nuclear power, in line with what was happening in other 
nuclear countries at the time. The democratisation processes affecting 
both countries from the mid-1970s onwards opened spaces for bilateral 
commissions of vigilance and, for the first time, an explicit agreement 
about the safety of border nuclear installations. Democratisation also 
opened the floodgates of political dissent, leading to the emergence of 
antinuclear movements. Such movements had started to grow interna-
tionally since the early 1970s, cooperating across borders and borrowing 
ideas and protest practices from each other, as the other contributions 
to this special issue amply demonstrate (Kaijser and Meyer, 2018a and 
2018b, Renard 2018, Kirchhof, 2018). During the 1980s, the majority of 
legislative and regulatory devices dealing with nuclear energy were mostly 
concerned with public health, radioprotection and the environment. It 
is also during this second phase that we can identify the earliest contacts 
of Spanish and Portuguese antinuclear activists, supporting each other in 
their domestic nuclear struggles, reinforcing the Portuguese anti-nuclear 
stance (after the official demise of its nuclear project in 1987) and leading 
to multiple instances of joint demonstrations against Spanish projects.
The third phase started in 1986 and goes until today, and its charac-
teristics contrast with the previous ones. This phase is marked by two 
crucial events: joining the EC and the Chernobyl accident. The first event 
allowed the European Commission to become an arbiter on Spanish/
Portuguese nuclear disputes, just as the Nordic Council framework did 
for the Danish/Swedish conflict around Barsebäck, as the relevant con-
tribution to this special issue demonstrates (Kaijser and Meyer, 2018b). 
The second implied that Portugal expanded its vigilance on nuclear issues 
beyond the thirty kilometres from the border initially considered in the 
transboundary agreement between both countries. The Almaraz NPP, 
one hundred kilometres from the border, upstream one of the principal 
rivers of the Peninsula, was redefined as “close”. Especially from 1987 
onwards, after the demise of the Portuguese nuclear endeavor, Portugal 
became particularly concerned with Spanish nuclear activities, request-
ing Brussels to intervene in each and every occasion, as made evident by 
the waste related cases of IPES and Almaraz, and more recently by the 
reopening of Spanish uranium mines. In these three cases, transboundary 
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issues attained a national dimension, clashing with the aspirations of 
antinuclear and environmental movements towards a radioactive-free 
Portugal. Demonstrations and other actions by social movements drew 
the attention of the Portuguese government that resorted to its foreign 
diplomacy devices to question Spanish projects. Realising that regular 
bilateral diplomatic channels with Spain were insufficient, Portugal 
eventually brought these issues to the attention of the European institu-
tions, which acted as a referee. However, the European Commission’s 
role as an independent arbiter in nuclear conflicts was a new one, and due 
to changing European legislation in the wake of Chernobyl. It differed 
fundamentally from how the EC was perceived in the 1970s, when it was 
attacked by a transnational alliance of anti-nuclear movements for being 
a relentless promoter of nuclear power (Meyer, 2013; Meyer 2014). The 
results of this chain of actions are mixed: the IPES was indeed cancelled 
but Almaraz waste repository will be eventually expanded, while the 
reopening of the uranium mines is still pending.
Siting and mining at the border led to a new pattern of foreign rela-
tions between the two countries from 1986 onwards. It also created new 
opportunities, this time not for government cooperation towards a com-
mon nuclear goal, but for the emergence of a joint, cross-border movement 
against nuclear energy. The case studies presented also make evident that 
social movements have an encompassing view of the nuclear realm that 
includes uranium mining, power plants and waste management, while insti-
tutionally only the last two made it to multilateral nuclear agreements of 
supervision of borders installations. Cross-border rivers – and the upstream 
location of the Spanish plants, with the downstream Portuguese being 
potentially affected – played a key role as vectors that triggered controversy 
and concerns about environmental impacts and environmental justice.
The transnational dimension of nuclear energy became self-evident after 
Chernobyl. Since 1987, when the energy policies of Spain and Portugal 
went separate ways, the border became a thin line separating two nuclear 
ontologies (Hecht, 2006). Borders can be understood as a metaphor 
indicating a clash of energy policies, but the trans-border character of 
radioactivity is also an opportunity for new forms of action, solidarity 
and cooperation. Nevertheless, more research is needed to unveil many of 
the aspects that remain unknown, particularly the role of specific actors, 
political groups and negotiations at the European Commission level, 
but also regarding the business side of the decision-making process, in 
order to understand better their specific role throughout the Spanish/
Portuguese nuclear history. These “invisibilities” may help us re-assess the 
real role played by social movements and diplomatic efforts in the closure 
of nuclear controversies at the Portuguese-Spanish border.
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